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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
MICHAEL Y. MALONEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

l
Case No.
7926

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY, a corporation,
Defendant arnd Respondent.

j

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since plaintiff has made only a general statement of
facts and deferred a discussion of the details of the evidence to an appropriate place in his argument, we shall
adopt the same procedure. We wish it understood, however, that we are not conceding the correctness of all that
is stated by plaintiff in his statement of facts. Any differences will be apparent as we give our version of the evidence.
POINTS RELIED ON
POINT NO. I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT.
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(a) THE UNDISPUTED TESTIMONY AS TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK EXISTING PRIOR TO THE
ACCIDENT REVEALS NO ACTIONABLE DEFECT.
(b) THE EVIDENCE OF THE CONDITION EXISTING
AFTER THE ACCIDENT DID NOT SHOW THAT AN ACTIONABLE DEFECT EXISTED PRIOR TO ACCIDENT.
POINT NO. II. MERE PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE WILL
NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT. THE NEGLIGENCE
PLEADED AND PROVED MUST HAVE BEEN A PROXIMATE CAUSE IN PRODUCING THE INJURY.
POINT NO. III. THE CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ARISING FROM A LATENT DEFECT IN THE SIDEWALK.
POINT NO. IV. THE VERDICT, THOUGH AWARDING
DAMAGES AS SPECIAL DAMAGES, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A GENERAL VERDICT IN THE SUM OF $1000
AND IS NO GROUNDS FOR A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT.
(a) THE UNDISPUTED TESTIMONY AS TO THE CONDITION OF THE SIDEWALK EXISTING PRIOR TO THE
ACCIDENT REVEALS NO ACTIONABLE DEFECT.

We feel that a proper presentation of the facts on
this, and the .succeeding subdivision, cannot be done by
simply stating our conclusions of what the evidence
shows. To say that the sidewalk was cracked, fissured,
and weakened does not give a true picture of conditions
nor does it reflect the actual testimony or evidence in
the case. We trust, therefore, that the court will bear with
us while we give in detail the testimony and evidence on
these crucial and determinative points.
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From plaintiff's testimony it appears that on November 21, 1951, at about 7 n1inutes to 9 o'clock A.M., he
was walking west on the north side of South Temple. As
he arrived at a point imn1ediately in front of the Bransford Apartments, to use his language:
""\Yell, I just went through the sidewalk real quickly
and fell." (R. 17) "A hole broke out of the sidewalk about
4 inches wide and about 1-! inches long and 14 inches
deep," and his right foot went into the hole. (R. 18)
In his direct testimony, he gives no description of
the condition of sidewalk as it existed prior to the time
of the accident. The accident happened on Wednesday.
He visited the scene of the accident on the following Monday. (R. 21) Before detailing what he saw on Monday,
some 4 or 5 days after the accident, we shall refer to his
testimony on cross examination insofar as it relates to
what he saw prior to the accident, and shall also refer
to the testimony of other witnesses on the same subject.
He had walked over the same sidewalk over a considerable period of time in walking to, work each morning.
At these times he had not noticed anything wrong with
the sidewalk. "I never gave it a thought." There wasn't
anything there that attracted his attention at all as to
being defective. On the morning of the accident he did
not notice anything that indicated the sidewalk was defective. (R. 30)
And as you walked along there you put your
foot on this particular part of the sidewalk
and it went down. Is that right~
A. That's right.

Q.
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Q. And prior to that time you had not seen anything that would indicate that was dangerous?
A.
Q.
A.

No.
Had you noticed these cracks~
Well, I have noticed a lot of cracks. I didn't
notice those particular ones. I didn't take particular notice at that time.
Q. As you walk down the sidewalk there are
cracks in different places, aren't there?
A. Yes.
Q. There was nothing that you saw in the condition of the sidewalk that indicated to you any
hazard~

A.

No. (R. 31-32)

On redirect examination he testified he did not go
along the sidewalk looking for defects. (R. 36)
The foregoing constituted all of plaintiff's testimony
as to condition of sidewalk before the accident.
Catherine Cartwright, witness for plaintiff and defendant, testified that she was walking on her way to
work behind plaintiff. She did not see him fall, but did
see him on the sidewalk, his foot in the hole. She had
fr~quently walked that way to work. (R. 39-42)

Q.

Had you at any time noticed anything particularly hazardous about this particular
place~

A.

Q.
A.

No.
Did it appear to have any difference in elevation one slab over another?
Insofar as I have been able to observe since
then even checking along there, there didn't
seem to be any difference. (R. 42) "The only
raise that I have noticed is since it was re-
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paired. It is higher now. There is a bump
there." (R. 43)
On cross examination by plaintiff.

Q. Did you particularly look for difference 1n
elevation~

A. No.
Q. And your testimony that you haven't noticed
it is based upon the fact that you haven't
tried to notice or observe~
A. That's right. I never paid any attention.
On redirect, she testified.

Q. Did you give it, as you passed along there, the
same ordinary inspection as you would anywhere else~
A. That's right. Just glanced to be sure where
I walked.
Q. In other words, you walked along there with
the same attention to the sidewalk as you
ordinarily use~
A. That's right.
The defendant produced as witnesses E. Wesley
Smith, Manager of the Eagle Gate Apartments, which is
the present name of the Bransford Apartments, George
A. Turner, gardener for said apartments, and Joseph
J ongejan, elevator operator for said apartments.
Mr. 'Smith testified he had been manager of the
apartments for 2112 years; that as part of his employment
he has made it a practice each morning to walk around all
the buildings and make observation and the sidewalk in
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front of the apartments is included in that inspection. On
the day of the accident, he arrived at the apartment at
8 A.M. At that time he was in front of the building and
passed over the sidewalk.

Q. Did you see anything there that would present
a hazard to pedestrians~
A. Nothing- nothing.
Q. And had you seen any there prior to that
time~

·A. No sir, I had not.
Q. Had there been something there that would
present a hazard, would you have been likely
to have seen it~
A. I am sure I would.
Q. That was your purpose in making the examina:tion ~
A. That was my purpose in going around
through the buildings. (R. 61-62)
Mr. Smith further testified that in addition to making inspections, he had occasion to assist in shoveling
snow from the sidewalk. Also, he would have the gardener hose off the sidewalk and keep it clean.

Q. Did you at any time notice, Mr. Smith, that
there were depressions there~
A. I never noticed depressions there except the
cracks. There was quite a number of cracks
that were apparent in the concrete but no evidence of any projection you could stumble
over.
Q. And no evidence of any appreciable depression?
A. No sir. (R. 63-64)
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On cross examination he testified that the cracks had
been there for years. "They were there when I first took
over the management."

Q. Have you noticed any essential change in the
cracks from the time you first took over the
management to date of this accident~ (R. 6364)
A. No sir. (R. 64)
George A. Turner, gardener for the apartments,
testified that he had occasion to be out on the sidewalk
in front of the apartn1ent about every day. (R. 65) He
noticed there was sort of a wide crack one half inch or
so in the pavement separating one row of cement blocks
from the other.

Q. Did you at any time notice any unevenness, any raises over which people might
stumble~

A.

Q.

No, there wasn't any. There wasn't any unevenness that I could see in it.
So far as you could see, the condition of the
sidewalk presented no hazard to people on the
street~

A.

No, I could not see any.

He testified that he had cleaned the snow off, swept
the walk once in awhile and hosed it off once in awhile.
At those times he discovered nothing that would indicate
any hazard to pedestrians. (R. 66-67)
On cross examination he testified he had been with
the apartment six years. During that time he did not
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notice any e·ssential change in the sidewalk and he had
not examined the sidewalks for defects, not being particularly concerned with that. He could not describe
where the cracks are as he had not paid too much attention to it. (R. 67-68)
Joseph J ongejan, elevator operator for 33 years,
testified that he had been in front of the building on his
way to and from work each day. Prior to the time of the
accident he didn't notice anything wrong at all. If he had,
"that is the first thing I would have notified Mr. Smith
as soon as I came in." At the time of the accident, "I
thought it was pretty well fixed for a long while. Very
nice."

Q.

Did you see any depression over which people
might stumble or lose their balance~
A. Not recently, no sir.
Q. Or differences in elevations~
A. Not in the time since the church took the building over. No sir. (8 or 10 years). (R. 69-70)
When asked the particularity with which he has made
his observation as to condition of sidewalk, he testified,
"Well, I always noticed if there was any paper laying on
the sidewalk and sticks so people won't fall over them
and I usually pick it up and take it inside and put it in
the garbage; otherwise, the sidewalk is always nice and
clean. I didn't never notice anything. There might be a
few, oh, little cracks that have been there ever so long,
but I didn't pay any attention to them."
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On cross examination he testified that he did not
know that there were cracks in the vicinity of where that
hole is now.

Q. You don't know of any particular crack anywhere on the sidewalk 1
A. No, just a few old cracks is all I know- every
day cracks -just a few on the outside by the
steps a little ways.
He did not know there is a crack immediately adjacent to the cement patch.

Q. In other words, your observation has just been
a casual observation of someone going in and
out of the building.
A. That's all. The sidewalk was in the same condition on November 21, 1951 as it had been
for 6 or 8 years prior thereto. (R. 71-2)
The foregoing constitutes all of the evidence as to
the condition of the sidewalk prior to the date of the accident by witnesses who had seen the sidewalk prior to the
accident. We submit that such evidence wholly fails to
establish any actionable defect. On the contrary, it affirmatively establishes there was no such defect, but only
some "every day cracks."
(b) THE EVIDENCE OF THE CONDITION EXISTING
AFTER THE ACCIDENT DID NOT SHOW THAT AN ACTIONABLE DEFECT EXISTED PRIOR TO ACCIDENT.

The plaintiff testified that on Monday following
Wednesday, the date of the accident, he returned to the
scene. (R. 21) Exhibits A, B & C, photos taken of the
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scene, were identified by plaintiff as accurately reflecting the condition of the scene of the accident as it appeared to him on Monday. These exhibits were admitted
in evidence over defendant's objection that no proper
foundation had been laid for their reception, there being
no evidence to show the pictures reflected the condition
of the hole immediately after the accident. (R. 22-23)
Using Exhibit A, and directing plaintiff's attention
to the line diagonally across the picture and against which
the ruler is leaning, he testified: That there was a difference in elevation between the cement to the north
(right) of this line and the cement to the south of this line
at the point where the ruler is, of about 1f2 inch, the north
being higher than the south. This is at the west end of
the hole. At the opposite, east, end of the hole, at the
round black object revealed in Exhibit A, he observed
the difference in elevation of an inch, the north cement
being higher than the south. (R. 24-25)
This is the same line or crack referred to by Mr.
Tu.rner. (R. 66) It marks the separation between the
City's walk on the south and the property walk on the
north. There actually is no crack at all. As shown by
defendant's Exhibit 3,' it separates the north and ~outh
concrete.
Plaintiff also testified that the slab of cement enclosed by the crack running along the left edge of Exhibit
A and then to the north, tipped down toward the hole.
Also the piece at the east end of the hole tipped slightly
down. (R. 25) There is absolutely no testimony, however, as to the degree of dipping or tipping.
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Referring to Exhibit B and to the line marked XX,
which runs fron1 the top of the picture down to the east
and west line already referred to, he testified he did not
notice much difference in elevation between the sides of
that crack. (R. 26) On cross examination he testified
that he couldn't see any difference in elevation and if it
had been noticeable he would have seen it. (R. 34)
He testified he did not obtain the yardstick shown
in Exhibits A, B & C; he doesn't know whose it is; and
it was not there on Monday. He had no ruler to measure
with. His estimate here is simply based upon a casual
observation. (R. 32-33)
Explaining further the difference in elevation between the north and south slabs at the west end of the
hole by the ruler, he testified there was no difference in
elevation 6 or 8 inches west of the hole, but from that
point east to the hole it sloped somewhat toward the hole.
Any slope of the rest of the pavement was not noticeable.
(R. 28)

The difference in elevation of 1 inch between the
north and south slabs at the east of the hole went east
about 6 or 8 inches. As to this difference in elevation it is
perfectly apparent from all the photos that there was a
small triangular chip in the surface of the south cement
strip extending easterly about 6 or 8 inches. The topping
had chipped off leaving the aggregate underneath exposed. The small stones of this aggregate are visible in
Exhibit A and also in defendant's Exhibit 2. Naturally
this loss of topping would cause the top of the cement
where that occurred to be somewhat lower than the surSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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face of the adjoining cement. But there is no testimony
that this topping was missing before the accident. The
presence of this chip would account for at least a substantial part, if not all, of the difference in elevation of 1
inch testified to by plaintiff. For aught that appears this
chip came out when the sidewalk collapsed under plaintiff's weight, and the testimony of all the witnesses who
testified as to the condition of the walk prior to the accident, including plaintiff, sustains that conclusion.
Joseph Novak, a graduate engineer, examined the
scene of the accident the day before the trial, which would
be September 29, 1952, about 10 months after the event
and also after the hole had been repaired. ( R. 46) He
testified that there was a difference in the appearance of
an old crack in cement and a new one, the former being
discolored and the faces of concrete being smoother due
to erosion. He made measurements along the crack shown
in Exhibit C, marked at the right edge of the photo by an
X. This is the crack that runs north and south from the
north edge of the City's walk through the entrance walk
leading to the apartment entrance. At a point 3 inches
north of the City walk, the west portion of the entrance
walk was lf2 inch lower than the portion east of the crack.
Eleven inches north of the City walk the west side of the
crack was % inches lower than the east side. Thirty
inches north of the City walk the west side of the crack
was% inch lower than the east. (R. 46-48)
The court permitted him to testify over objection,
that when the hole was repaired, the surface of the patch
sloped up toward the east to meet the elevation of the ori-
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ginal cement. The joinder being at the crack marked X,
Exhibit C. The original cement at that point was 1,4 inch
higher than the surface of the patch at a point 3, inches
to the west. (R. 49)
The cracks appearing on Exhibit C to the left of the
ruler were not visible to him, the patch having covered
them. The crack that extends to the west is visible a short
distance. (R. 50) "The concrete where the sidewalk is in
the immediate area of the patch, not being the patch, its
adjacent area, the general slope of the concrete was in
the direction of the patch." (R. 51) The difference in the
elevation of the cement bordering the crack running north
towards the building, marked X, was due to the west side
subsiding, it had sunk. (R. 52)
The crack, still visible and outside the patch, is the
crack that extends west from the letter "0" on Exhibit
C. The crack extending east to the other "0" is covered
by the patch. The crack that is visible is at least 4 years
old. He saw a very faint crack in the cement west of the
hole, indicated by the letter "A" on Exhibit B, being about
6 inches west of the patch. The sidewalk sloped from the
crack towards the patch. (R. 55) He observed no difference in elevation between the north slab and the south
slab between Point A and the patch. (R. 57)
It will be noticed that nowhere does the witness attempt to give the rate or degree of slope or any testimony
to indicate even any substantial slope. He admitted he
had no opinion as to how long the difference in elevation
had existed along the crack running north from the City
sidewalk to the building.
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The foregoing testimony of plaintiff and ~Ir. Novak,
together with the photos to which they referred, constitutes all of the evidence submitted by plaintiff in his attempt to show the existence of an actionable defect in the
walk at the time of the accident. Plaintiff's testimony
concerns what he saw by a casual glance five days after
the accident. He says the north strip of cement, the strip
leading into the apartment entrance, as shown by defendant's Exhibit 1, was about 1j2 inch higher at the northwest
corner of the hole than the south, or City sidewalk, the
difference in elevation sloping up from that point west
6 inches to become even on both sides of the line. Over
on the east edge of the hole, where the topping is chipped
off, he said the north side was an inch above the south
side. No evidence is given that the triangular chip in the
topping was missing before the accident, so there is absolutely no evidence that the difference in elevation between
the north and south sides of the line existed at the time
the accident happened. As to the crack running north
through the apartment entrance approach, he saw no difference in elevation between the east and west side of the
crack.
Mr. Novak, about ten months later, measured the
differences in elevation between the east and west sides
of this north and south crack and found difference in elevation of 1;2 and % inches. But this crack, concededly is
not on the city sidewalk. Furthermore, Novak admits he
has no opinion as to how long that elevation had existed;
that the difference in elevation would tend to increa~e
with passage of time. As to the condition in the vi('inity
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of the hole, he merely testifies as to certain small cracks
as being -l: or 5 years old; that the sidewalk slopes up to
meet the patch put in by the City at some places. The
only description of the degree of the slope was at one
place the slope was slight, at another place, the east side
of the patch sloped up 14 inch to meet the pavement.
Such a slope is no indication as to what the condition was
before the accident. It only indicates the persons putting
in the patch put it in in that fashion. Nowhere does he
give an opinion that these slopes indicated any kind of
depression in the original sidewalk, or any condition of
hazard to pedestrians, or any indication that the sidewalk
was weakened or that such sloping gave any warning that
a condition existed that would put the City on notice that
a hazard existed.
We submit that plaintiff's evidence wholly failed to
prove the existence of an actionable defect in the walk at
the time of the accident. But any inferences that the conditions testified to by plaintiff existed on the day of the
accident are completely dispelled by defendant's evidence.
Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence as to conditions after
the accident was not competent to prove conditions on
the date of the accident, without a showing that no change
in the conditions had occurred in the meantime. No such
showing was made.
In Winkler vs. City of Columbus, Ohio App. -

71

N.E. 2d 729, the plaintiff sought to testify as to her observations of the sidewalk the day following the accident.
The court held this testimony was not competent "for the
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reason that it did not appear that there had not been any
change in the condition of the walk."
First of all, there is undisputed evidence that the
condition at the hole did change between the time of the
accident and the following Monday, when plaintiff was
there making observations. This is made clearly manifest
by comparing plaintiff's photo Exhibit A and defendant's
photo Exhibit 2. It was stipulated that Exhibit 2, as well
as 1 and 3, were taken by the police photographer at the
time the ambulance came for plaintiff immediately after
the accident. (R. 75) Exhibit A was· taken looking northwest, Exhibit 2 was taken looking north, north being indicated by a small blue "N" at the'top margin. Exhibit 2
shows that a large part of the concrete along the nortli
edge of the break was still in place and the broken off part
appears in the hole close to the surface. In Exhibit A,
nearly all of this cement along the north of the hole is
gone, leaving only a little sliver, running to the black spot
referred to in plaintiff's testimony at the east edge of the
hole. Somehow that cement was knocked off and the hole
beneath is revealed in Exhibit A, but not in Exhibit 2.
The broken piece is not in the same position in the hole in
Exhibit A compared with Exhibit 2. Likewise, the piece
of cement intact along the south and west sides of the hole
is less in Exhibit A than in Exhibit 2, showing a further
breaking off and displacement occurred between the day
of the accident and the following Monday. These same
differences in the conditions can be seen by comparing
Exhibit 2 with Exhibits Band C. It is evident that someone broke off the ledges of the cement and 1noved the
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broken piece in the hole. This breaking would undoubtedly disturb the remaining cement at the edges, if any appreciable pressure was applied to break off these pieces,
as the cavity extends to the east and to the west of the
hole. This disturbance could easily account for the difference in elevation testified to by plaintiff.
That such is the real explanation of the differences
in elevation at the time plaintiff made his observation
on l\Ionday is established without dispute by the testimony of defendant's witnesses, W. L. Gardner and W. Y.
Tipton.
Mr. Gardner, claim agent for the City, testified that he
went up to the scene first about 10 A.M. and again at 11
A.M. the day of the accident. (R. 87) He examined the
slabs adjoining the hole and found them level. Exhibit
3 is a photo looking east up the sidewalk. It shows a
heavy line separating the north concrete from the city
sidewalk. This is the same line against which the ruler
is leaning in plaintiff's Exhibit C. In the vicinity of the
hole, there was no difference in elevation between the concrete north and south of the line. There was no sloping
at the point "A" on plaintiff's Exhibit B. (Mr. Novak
testified there was a slight slope toward the patch at that
part.) (R. 86) The piece of cement on the east side of the
hole, shown on Exhibit "B" which is separated by a crack'
mark, was also level. As to the crack running toward the
building marked X, on Exhibit C, there was a difference
in elevation between the concrete on each side of not more
than 14 inch. Along the main sidewalk he saw nothing
over which people might stumble. (R. 87) The cement in
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the area of the hole did not tip toward the hole. Most of
the cavity was north of the hole. (R. 88) The cavity was
2 or 3 feet wide east and west, and 21j2 feet north of the
hole, measured north and south, and about 6 inches south
of the hole. (R. 90) None of the· sidewalk dipped toward
the hole. (R. 91) It was stipulated that the north side of
the hole is the north side of the City walk.
Mr. Tipton, a licensed civil engineer and surveyor
and chief draftsman in the City Engineer's office, testified on the date of the accident he visited the scene shortly
before noon. He made measurements and prepared a
sketch in evidence as Exhibit 4. The City sidewalk is 8
feet wide. The cement to the north is 4 feet 3 inches
wide. (R. 93) He measured the height of the one slab
above the other along the crack marked "y", Exhibit 4,
being the crack XX on Exhibit B that Novak testified
he measured. At the point of greatest departure the difference in elevation was four-tenths inch, the east slab
being higher than the west side. The difference is not
quite as much against the north side of the City walk and
the upper third next to the steps the slabs were practically flush, not more than one-tenth in variation. (R. 96)
He outlin~d on Exhibit 4, the perimeter of the cavity
as he determined it. The north and south diameter of the
cavity is about 4 feet, 3 feet being north of the center of
the hole in the cement walk and 1 foot being south thereof. The cavity extends 2 feet east of the center of the
hole in the walk and about 3 feet to the west thereof. (R.
97-98)
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He observed the condition of the sidewalk immediately around the hole and found it flat, no protuberances
or raises, the pieces of concrete separated by cracks, as
shown in Exhibit 2, were flush with each other. They
were practically flush, the whole area around the hole.
There wasn •t any difference in elevation between the concrete on the north, and the concrete on the south constituting the main sidewalk in the immediate vicinity of the
hole. "There might have been an Vs of an inch, or sOlnething like that, but I mean for all practical purposes, it is
practically flat." He saw no hazard except the hole itself.
E. L. K~insman, repaired the hole April 8, 1952. He
had to enlarge the opening in the sidewalk to fill the
cavity. He saw no difference in elevation between the
City sidewalk and the cement entrance to the apartment
on the north. (R. 74) He saw no difference in elevation
between these cement rows at the line which separated
them. (R. 76) The cement around the hole was not protruding anywhere. It was perfectly flat with nothing to
make a hazard if the hole was not there. (R. 77) Before
he repaired the hole there was a difference in elevation
in the triangle at the east end of the hole of approximately 1f2 inch. This is the dark spot on Exhibit A, at the
northeast corner of the hole. (R. 79) On cross examination, Kinsman testified that the little triangular dark
place on the east side of the hole on Exhibit A is where
the topping had come. off, and it gave down a little bit,
and at that place the City walk was from 1;4 to lh inch
lower than the cement to the north. (R. 78-79) He also
testified that the City sidewalk and cement to the north
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were separated by a felt strip. So the line shown on Exhibit A and the other photos running between the two
strips of cement is not a crack at all. It is merely a felt
strip se·parating the two rows of cement. This is explained by the fact that the City sidewalk was put in before the walk to the north. (R. 95)
Lynn Glines, repair foreman, testified he was at the
scene the day repairs were made. As to the difference
in elevation between the City sidewalk and the walk to the
north, he first testified there was a slight difference, and
then on cross examination admitted he had no clear memory about it and paid no attention to it.
We think the foregoing analysis of the evidence
completely meets and refutes the conclusions and general
statements of counsel as to the facts, without repeating
counsel's assertions and then give the answering facts
from the record. Counsel asserts that the photos show a
difference in elevation between the City walk and the cement to the north. Take Exhibit B. It is admitted by
Novak that at point A there was no difference in elevation. It was admitted by plaintiff that on the east side
of the hole, 6 or 8 inches beyond the· hole, there was no
difference in elevation. Looking at the line west and east
of Point A and west and east of the crack at point X, east
of the hole, we submit there is absolutely nothing revealed
there that shows any difference in elevation between the
two cement strips east or west. Exhibits 1 and 3 show
perfect evenness.
The authorities generally support the rule stated in 7
McQuillan, MUIYI!icipal Corporation, p. 125, sec. 2956:
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"To be actionable, the obstruction must be
dangerous, and the danger must be such as a reasonably prudent person ·would have anticipated as
a natural result."
In Pollari rs. Salt Lake City, 111 Ut. 25, 176 P. 2d
111, the court approved an instruction that the city would
be liable if the defect ""was of such a character as to constitute a hazard to pedestrians using the sidewalk while
exercising due care for their own safety."
In that case no question was raised as to whether
a defect was of a character to be actionable or not. But
in addition to there being a hole 5 x 3 inches and 11,6
inches deep, there was an abrupt raise of 2 to 21j2 inches
in the slab next to the sidewalk and it was because of
this combination the accident happened.
Davidson v. City of New York, 117 NYS 185:
"It is impossible to free a city from such slight
defects and unreasonable to say or permit a jury
to say, that they are 'obvious dangers' which is the
test of the city's liability. We know that they are
not. If they were, thousands and thousands would
be hurt by them hourly. That it is 'possible' for
someone out of many, out of millions, as it may be,
to trip on such a defect does not make it dangerous. Probability, not possibility governs."

Forrester v. City of Nashville, 179 Tenn. 682, 169
S.W. 2d 860: The court quotes from McQuillin above
and states:
"Probability, not possibility governs; that it
is 'possible' for someone out of many to trip on so
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slight a projection in a sidewalk as 1s here Involved does not make it dangerous."
City of Da;yton v. Fox, 254 Ky. 51,70 S.W. 2d, 961:
"It is well settled that the liability of the city
is not that of a guarantor or insurer of the safety
of the pedestrian. The city is only bound to use
reasonable care in making the streets and sidewalks safe and convenient for travel. It is under
no obligation to provide against everything that
may happen upon them, but only for such things
as ordinarily exist or such as may be reasonably
expected to occur to the users thereof when in the
exercise of ordinary care for their own safety.
Mere unevenness of the surface of the sidewalk is
not such obvious dangerous or unsafe condition as
to impress the mind of a reasonably prudent person as unsafe. Dangerous or unsafe conditions
will not be presumed from the accident alone and
the mere fact that a pedestrian slipped and fell
upon the sidewalk is insufficient to warrant a
recovery, unless it is shown that the condition of
the walk at the place was necessarily dangerous or
unsafe for pedestrians where in the exercise of
ordinary care for their own safety, and the unsafe
condition was the proximate cause of the injury.''
Under the rule above stated, it is clear that there
was no proof of an actionable defect existing at the time
the accident happened or even at the time the plaintiff
visited the hole five days later, not considering, of course,
the hole itself.
POINT NO. II. MERE PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE WILL
NOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT. THE NEGLIGENCE
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PLEADED AND PROVED MUST HAVE BEEN A PROXIMATE CAUSE IN PRODUCING THE INJURY.

It is clear from plaintiff's own testimony that his
fall \Vas not in any \vise caused by the differences in elevation between the City sidewalk and the property walk
to the north, even assuming the evidence tended to show
some difference in elevation existed at the time of the
accident. Likewise, it is also clear that the difference
in elevation between the east and west sides of the crack
running north through the prope·rty entrance walk did not
cause him to fall. He did not stumble, or turn his ankle,
or slip, or in any other manner experience anything untoward because of either of these differences in elevation.
His fall was occasioned by the collapsing of the piece of
sidewalk which gave way under his weight because of the
lack of support underneath due to the cavity.
Counsel assumes that because plaintiff testified there,
was a difference of 1f2 inch in elevation of the north
cement over the City walk at the west end of the hole
and one inch difference in elevation at the east end of the
hole, this is proof there was a difference in elevation between the two slabs of cement running the entire length of
the hole. There is absolutely no evidence on which to base
such an assumption, nor is there any evidence as to what
difference in elevation, if any, there may have been, assuming there was a difference. For aught that appears
in plaintiff's evidence the difference in elevation was confined to the two places to the west and east ends of the
hole. The two slabs of cement may have been absolutely
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level all of the rest of the way along the north edge of the
hole.
It is without dispute that the claimed difference in
elevation to the east and west of the hole did not cause
or permit any collapse at those places for no collapse
actually occurred there, even though these two places
were actually over the cavity. The photographs show
these places to be perfectly intact.
Furthermore, the line between the two slabs of cement was not a crack, in the sense contended for by counsel. It was simply the separation, or expansion, joint
between the two rows of cement put in at different times.
Whether one was higher than the other when put in does
not appear. Nor does such difference in elevation indicate a weakness or any element which would contribute
to the collapse. There is no evidence there was a difference in elevation along the south side of the hole, and yet,
the sidewalk gave way there as well as along the north
side.
The all important fact in this case is that the sidewalk was not supported underneath. Had there been sustaining earth, the presence of the crack, such as counsel
has created out of assumptions and speculations, would
have caused no collapse and no accident. Yet he disclaims
any attempt to impute notice of the presence of the cavity
from notice of the presence of the crack. He asserts the
crack weakened the sidewalk thus permitting it to collapse, so the crack became a contributing cause of the
collapse and the attending accident, even though the
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crack referred to was there from the time the sidewalk
to the north was laid.
First he talks about a difference in elevation as being
the defect of which the City had notice claiming such defect constituted a hazard. Then he abandons the element
of elevation and says there was a crack and the crack was
what caused the weakening. But the crack was not caused
by the one side subsiding as in the case of the crack running north to the apartment entrance. There had always
been a crack there as the city walk was put in first and a
felt strip separated it from the cement later laid by the
property owners. The subsiding of the city's walk, if ·any,
did not create a crack so as to weaken the carrying power
of the sidewalk to span the cavity underneath as the
separation was already there before any subsidence.
There had always been two separate strips of cement, the
city sidewalk and the apartment entrance walk. The presence of a difference in elevation to the west and east of
the hole does not indicate that the sidewalk there was
weakened in a longitudinal direction so that it would not
hold up as a span over a cavity existing underneath. This
same crack, the separation of the city sidewalk from the
owner's walk, runs the entire length of the two strips of
cement as shown on Exhibit 3. The presence of this so
called crack, elsewhere than at the hole, presents no
reason for assuming that the sidewalk is actually weakened all along this course. The same conclusion must likewise follow as to that part of this same crack as it passes
the hole.
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So it appears from the very nature of the construction that the crack referred to by counsel had always existed. Of the existence of that crack the city concededly
had notice, but that does not prove that the difference in
·elevation testified to by plaintiff had existed before the
accident or that the city had notice thereof. And that difference in elevation is the defect of which counsel says
the city had notice. The evidence is undisputed there was
no difference· in elevation before the accident or at a time
shortly after and on the day of the accident as we have
already demonstrated from the testimony by plaintiff
and Mr. Cartwright, Mr. Smith, Mr. T-qrner, Mr. Jongejan, Mr. Gardner and Mr. Tipton. The city was not called
upon to prove that the difference in elevation testified
to by pla,intiff was a recent condition arising only after
the accident. On the contrary, the burden was on plaintiff to show that the difference in eleva.tion had existed
a sufficient length of time before the accident so that
notice of its presence could be imputed to the city.
Counsel further injects into his description of the
sidewalk, as a part of a visible defect of which he said
the city had notice, the phrase "general fissured and
cracked condition" of the sidewalk. By this he must refer
to the cracks and fissures shown on Exhibit C, as being
to the east and south of the hole. But those cracks and
fissures cannot have had any causal connection with the
collapse. They were still there after the accident, unaffected by the collapse, and having no connection with
the hole in the sidewalk. These cracks and fissures constitute no hazard. The surface of the cement around them
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and adjacent to them was perfectly even. The crack running north in the apartment entrance walk had no connection with the hole and remained there apart from the
hole after the accident. It had no connection whatever
with the hole. The repeated use of such general descriptiYe words and the total absence of any connection between the condition so described and the accident emphasizes the necessity we expressed in the beginning of making a thorough and detailed statement of the evidence.
The sidewalk laid by the City was not designed to
span cavities underneath. It was designed and intended
to rest upon supporting earth. As so designed and intended the mere presence of cracks therein would not
affect its use with perfect safety. Suppose someone unknown to the city had excavated underneath the cement
walk an hour. before the plaintiff came along. The accident could have resulted the same as it did. Could any
one say that the cracked and fissured condition would
then have made the city liable for the accident~ There is
absolutely no distinction between such a situation and
the one here involved except in the former we might know
who made the excavation and when. All that the cracked
and fissured condition, visible on any of the photos, could
possibly do would be to furnish a condition upon which
the real cause, the cavity, could operate, if it did. That
the cracked and fissured condition referred to by counsel
did not have even that aspect is demonstrated by the
photographs themselves as there was no cave in at that
location. But it must be constantly kept in mind that
there is no evidence whatever that there was a fissured
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and cracked condition in or immediately around the slab
of sidewalk that did cave in, the only location on the sidewalk that could have any connection whatever with the
cavity. The only crack shown to be in existence at the
hole was the separation between the city walk and the
walk to the north. How can it be said, then, that the
cracked and fissured condition of the sidewalk was a
contributing cause to the collapse of sidewalk~
Counsel states that: "The negligence of the city is
in permitting this crack (separation between the city walk
and the apartment entrance block) to go unrepaired for
four years. The unrepaired crack was one of the main
and direct causes of the sidewalk failure." What was unrepaired about this crack~ Certainly the city had the
right to install its 8 foot walk and the owner of the property install an abutting walk with a separation or expansion joint between. It would have been physically impossible not to have left some crack between the two walks.
This same crack continues east and west of the cavity all
along the two rows of concrete walk. (Exhibit 3) Counsel
certainly does not mean that the city, to properly maintain its sidewalk, should have eliminated this crack so
there would have been complete adhesion between the
city walk and the apartment walk. He can only mean that
the city should have repaired by eliminating the claimed
difference in elevation between these rows of cement at
the places testified to by plaintiff. F·ailure to do that
is actually the only negligence that can be claimed or
charged. But that negligence did not eontribute to the
collapsing since the same separation between the two
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walks would be there regardless of whether there was a
difference in elevation between the walks. The difference
in elevation could have been repaired so as to eliminate
it as a traffic hazard, but not, of course, to give the walk
more carrying strength, either by chipping back a little
on the north walk or by putting in a little black top along
the city walk as Mr. Gardner testified had frequently been
done. (R. 92) But the danger of collapse would have remained unabated.
We shall not attempt any protracted discussion of
the question of proximate cause. Under the authorities
cited by plaintiff the injury complained of must be a
"direct", to use the language of the English case cited, or
an "actual", to use the language of Stone v. Railroad, result of the negligence relied on.
In Harrstrich v. O.S.L.R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 P.
100, where the negligence relied on was the failure to ring
the bell or give proper warning before the train started
across the highway, the court said:
"The controlling question, however, is, was
the negligence of defendant the proximate cause
of the injury sustained by plaintiff~ It is a fundamental principle of law that no matter how gross
the negligence complained of may be, it crea;tes no
liability unless it is the proximate cause of the injury."
In Kawaguchi v. Bennett, ______ Utah 189, P. 2d 109,
this court quotes approvingly an instruction defining
proximate cause as that cause which in natural continuous sequence, unbroken by any active intervening cause,
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produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.
In Sumsion v. Streator Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132
P. 2d 680, the court says:
"It is a fundamental principle of the law of
negligence that the person complaining has the
burden of showing a causal connection between
the negligent conduct complained of and the injury
to plaintiff....
"While deductions may be based on probabili-·
ties, the evidence must do more than merely raise
a conjecture or show a probability. Where there
are probabilities the other way equally or more
potent the deductions are mere guesses and the
jury should not be permitted to speculate. The
rule is well established in this jurisdiction that
where the proximate cause of injury is left to conjecture, plaintiff must fail as a matter of law."
In Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P. 2d 1366, 104
A.L.R. 943, in his dissenting opinion Judge Wolfe discusses the question of causal connection between the
negligence relied on and the injury sustained. We refer
particularly to his discussion of the 8th class, covering
the omission class, where he stated in part:
"By the very nature of this type of alleged
negligence it is often times difficult to say whether
the accident would probably not have happened
but for the omission, or, put in another wa)', that
the omission contributed to the accident. It will
be found in those cases where it is said such alleged cause is too remote, the true reason is that
there is not sufficient probability that a supplying
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of the mnlSSlon would have avoided the acCIdent."
2 Restatement Law of Torts, Sec. 431, the rule is
stated thus :

" (a) In order to be a legal cause of another's
harm, it is not enough that the harm would not
have occurred had the actor not been negligent.
Except as stated in Sec. 432 (2), this is necessary
but it is not of itself sufficient. The negligence
must also be a substantial factor as well as an actual factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.
The word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact
that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in
producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to
regard it as a cause, using the word in the popular
sense in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the so-called 'philosophic sense,' which includes every one of the
great number of events without which any happening would not have occurred. Each of these
events is a cause in the so-called 'philosophic
sense,' yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of
them as causes."
"(b) It is only where the evidence permits
a reasonable finding that the defendant's conduct
had 1some effect that the question whether the
effect was substantial rather than negligible becomes imporant."

~

tl

This is the same rule advocated by Professor Smith
1n the Harvard Law Review referred to in plaintiff's
brief. A very interesting and instructive discussion of
the various rules for determining proximate cause is con-
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tained in the majority and minority opinions in Mahoney
v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 A. 762, 66 A.L.R. 1121,
where the views of the various authorities in texts and
articles are discussed. The dissenting opinion continued
to uphold the rule that a "wrong doer, though not guilty
of intentional wrong should be held for all the harmful
results caused by his wrong doing. I think the limitation
of liability for wrong doing to those results which follow
in a natural sequence accords with an innate sense of
justice in the ordinary man." Foreseeability of the resulting harm as the text is rejected by both opinions. And,
yet, after the accident, in determining whether the results
can be traced in natural sequence back to the negligence
charged, the foreseeability of resulting harm would iri
all probability be demonstrated.
New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Burge, 191 Miss. 303,
2 So. 2d 825, follows the rule in Reinstatement of Torts
above quoted and says :
".An actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another
if it would have sustained even if the actor had not
been guilty of the particular negligence charged. H
In Peterson v. Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 256 N.W. 901,
the court refers to 16 Minn. Law Review 829, and states:
"The rule there advocated is that one's negligence should be a material element in causing another's injury before it can be said to be the proximate cause thereof. It is very interesting to note
that .A.L. Institute Restatement of Torts has

'
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abandoned altogether the words 'proximate cause'
thereof and substituted therefor the words 'substantial factor'."
Without citing further authorities on the question of
proximate cause, we assert that no matter what test is ape.
plied to this case there is no causal connection between
the accident and the claimed difference in elevation of the
city walk and the adjoining walk. Under the conditions
shown by the evidence the accident would have happened
if there had been no difference in elevation. The presence
of the so-called crack could have no effect in weakening
the sidewalk as there had never been any adhesion
between the two walks.
We cite the following cases to illustrate the necessity
for causal connection between the aefects complained
of and the resulting injury.

Davis v. Potter, 340 Pa. 485, 17 A. 2d 338. Here a
part of the sidewalk was raised from % inch to 1 and Ys
inch above the rest of the walk by paving what had formerly been a grating over a light well. Plaintiff said her
foot went over the incline, it went off like a slant. "What
was complained of is the slight elevation of part of the
sidewalk, but she did not stumble or trip over it; and
whether it was actually the cause of her fall is far from
clear. Negligence is not a ground for recovery unless the
causative factor of the accident."
The case is followed in Harrison v. City of Pittsburg, 253 Pa. 22, 44 A. 2d 273, where plaintiff slipped on
the metal rim of the man hole in the sidewalk covered
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with snow. The court points out that the depression
around the manhole had nothing to do with her fall.
Thurbron v. Dravo Contracting Co., 238 Pa. 443, 86
A. 292, 44 L.R.A. NS 699. A team of horses ran away
and because no barriers were erected across the street,
the bridge being then in the process of being removed, the
team plunged into the river. The court says:
"The defendant's negligence in failing to erect
barriers on the embankments may be conceded, but
liability for plaintiff's loss does not result therefrom, except as such negligence was the proximate
cause. The mere concurrence of one's negligence
with the proximate and efficient cause of the disaster will not create liability. But for the escape
of horses from the control of the party in charge
the accident would not have happened. For that
escape defendants, of course, were not liable."
POINT NO. III. THE CITY IS NOT LIABLE FOR INJURIES ARISING FROM A LATENT DEFECT IN THE SIDEWALK.•

While the plaintiff seeks to avoid the effect of the
proposition above stated by saying he is relying on the
"fissured, cracked, weakened condition of the sidewalk
at the point where collapse occurred," we submit that the
cavity is the sole proximate cause of the accident and that,
since the city had no notice of its presence, it is not liable
in this case as a matter of law. We refer the court to the
following cases:
Mathews v. City of Richmond, 291 Ky. 387, 164 S."\V.
2d 968. Here the concrete walk broke under plaintiff
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and he dropped into a hole 18 inches deep, the base of the
walk had disintegrated, leaving only a thin top layer.
There was a crack in the concrete 12 feet long, but no
hole was visible. Photographs were introduced in evidence. The court held the crack was not sufficient to
put the city on notice, saying:
"The defect was latent. The crack in the concrete as described in the evidence and shown by
the photograph, was insufficient to put the city
on notice ....
"There \Yas no proof that the city had actual
notice of the defective condition of the sidewalk,
and the proof relied upon to show that the condition existed for such length of time as to impute
knowledge thereof to the municipal authoritie8
was insufficient to warrant a submission of that
question to the jury."

German v. City of McKeesport, 137 Pa. Super 41, 8
A. 2d 437. Here there was a hole 16 inches long and 2'"'
inches wide that was filled with dirt. It appeared to be
of the same material as the sidewalk and no hole appeared
to the casual observer. Plaintiff's heel sank into the hole
and she was thrown. The court says:
"She (Plaintiff) relied upon constructive
notice of the alleged defect, for none other was alleged or proved. Before a municipality may be
charged with constructive notice. of the existence
of a defect (in a sidewalk), it must appear that the
dangerous condition is apparent upon reasonable
inspection. In Emery v. Pittsburg, 275, Pa. 551, P.
553, 119 A. 603, p. 604, it is said:
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'A municipality can be charged with constructive notice of a defect in a sidewalk only
when it is of such a character as to be generally observable by pedestrians; that is, such
as could and naturally would be seen by
people using the walk.'
"This means that the dangerous condition
must be such as to be observed and apprehended
by the ordinary pedestrian. If it is of a nature
to require very close examination before its dangerous character appears, the municipality is not
chargeable with constructive notice of it."

Baustian v. Young, 152 Mo. 317, 53 S.W. 921. As
plaintiff walked on a board sidewalk, a plank gave way
causing him to fall. The soil underneath the plank had
washed out, leaving a hollow underneath the plank. The
plank itself was decayed, but would not have given way
except for the hollow under it. In holding for the city,
the court says :
"
It was really the hollow in the ground
that permitted the plank to go down. There is no
testimony tending to show actual notice to the city
of the condition of the sidewalk, and no testimony
tending to show how long it had remained in that
condition. Besides, the testimony of plaintiff
shows that the real cause of the yielding of the
plank under the plaintiff's weight was the hollow
beneath, caused by the ground being washed out.
When that occurred is not shown. That tlie defect
was not so obvious as to impute notice is shown
by the plaintiff's testimony. The plaintiff, himself,
had passed along the road frequently about the
time,- not over the sidewalk,- but in the roaa,
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and had never observed such condition, and the
five witnesses for defendant used the sidewalk
daily several times, and did not observe it. The
evidence fails to show any knowledge on the part
of the city, or any circumstance from which notice
could be implied, or that the city had neglected
a reasonable opportunity to repair the defect.
Under such evidence there could have been no
verdict for the plaintiff."

City of Omaha v. Kochen, 74 Neb. 718, 105 N.W. 182.
The court says :
"Where the defect is latent, not visible to ordinary inspection, implied notice of the defect will
not be presumed and will not be charged against
the city until something occurs from which notice
may be presumed or implied."

Wakeham v. Township of St. Clair, 91 Mich. 15, 51
N.W. 696. The township had constructed a break water
along the edge of the river with an earth fill behind it.
The road ran along within 13 feet of the breakwater. The
river became high and near the bridge two large holes
appeared in the road. Plaintiff while riding his horse
turned it toward the break water to avoid a mud puddle
in the road. There was a dispute whether the horse in
so turning had stepped into one of the existing holes or
broken through farther on where the water had undermined the road. The court says :
"If, however, the accident occurred at the
point five or six rods north of the bridge, and the
injury was occasioned by the horse breakin~
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through what, upon the surface, appeared to be
solid earth, defendant could not be chargeable
with negligence. The court below assumed that the
township was bound to know that this particular
spot in the road way was weak, and that it should
have repaired it, and laid down one rule whereby
to test plaintiff's negligence, and another to measure the defendant's. If the road appeared safe to
plaintiff, why not to defendant's officers~ This is
not a structure like a bridge, where decay inevitably exhibits itself, and where opportunity
is had to foresee and avoid that danger. Here were
some 60 or 80 rods of this breakwater. Two holes
appeared within 30 feet of this bridge, and one
20 or 30 rods north of the bridge. Prior to this
accident, but 3 or 4 feet of the entire line had
give way. If the accident occurred at the point
claimed by defendant, this very horse had probably traversed at a gallop some 3 rods of this line,
and had not broken through. This defect was
latent. The most that was known by the township authorities was that these breaks were liable
to occur, but just where there was no means of
discovering, except, perhaps, as was said by one
witness, by digging down and finding out, and
this very course would make them more liable to
occur. There was nothing so suggestive of danger
at that point as to make the township liable for the
injury. Not only were the surface indications all
right, but the horse broke through 13 or 1+ feet
east of the traveled way. It is probable occurrences, rather than possible happenings, that
municipalities are required to guard against. Cavities occur over waterpipes, gas-pipes, and sewer
pipes in the traveled parts of the streets of our
densely populous cities, hut a eave at one point
does not indicate that the street will <'aYe for the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
whole length of the conduit, and does not impose
the duty of testing the entire length of the street.
Defendant ·was entitled to an instruction that, if
the accident occurred at the point five or six rods,
north of the bridge, and the hole made by plaintiff's horse did not exist before the accident, but
was n1ade at the time of the accident by plaintiff's horse, and there was nothing upon the surface of the road at that point to give notice or
knowledge that a hole was being eaten away underneath by the water, the plaintiff cannot recover.'-r
Taylor ,~·. Town of Sterling, 250 ~lass. 123, 145 N.E.
40. The driver of a wagon turned out into a gutter to
pass another vehicle. The surface o.f the gutter gave way,
letting the wheel down about 18 inches, throwing plaintiff
to the ground. The three occupants of the wagon testified
that the surface of the gutter looked allright; that the surface looked perfectly safe; the same as it had looked when
they passed over the street. After the accident it appeared that the sub-surface had been washed out, and where
the wheel went down there was a hole 3 feet long. The
court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff saying:
"Although one witness testified that the place
where the wagon wheel went down looked as if it
had been in that condition for some time, there was
no evidence as to how long such condition had existed. It appears from the testimony of all the
witnesses who were in the wagon at the time of the
accident that there was nothing from the appearance of the surface of the gutter where the wheel
broke through to show that it had been gullied out
underneath or that it was in any way defective, but
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that so far as could be seen it was safe and in good
condition, and there was no evidence to the contrary.
"In these circumstances it is impossible to see
how any reasonable inspection of the way by the
town or its officers, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have discovered the hidden defective condition. If the officers of the town charged
with the duty of keeping its ways in repair had inspected this road immediately preceding the accident, there was nothing so far as the evidence discloses to ·give them any knowledge of the defect
which resulted in the injuries received by the
plaintiffs."

Silva v. City of Somerville, 253 Mass. 545, 149 N.E.
410.

"PER CURIAM. The testimony of the plaintiff was in substance that while walking across a
public street in the defendant city she stepped on
a hollow about eighteen inches across and three or
four inches lower than the street level. It did not
drop down abruptly. It looked like it had rained
and had sunk in. It was near a manhole raised
about three or four inches above the street level.
The earth gave way under her step making a hole
about as big as a manhole. Other witnesses described the resulting hole as being as big as a flour
barrel, and three or four feet deep, and as being an
irregular opening in the street and larger in circumference underneath than on the surface. One
witness testified that about a week prior to the
accident he 'had observed a sort of a round hole
in the street as though the street had sunk in five
or six inches; that it was a graduated hole. ShortlY
after he first noticed it he noticed there was ~
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cover over it- his impression being that it was
some sort of a stick, something as though to give
warning that there was a hole; and that he noticed
that a day or two before the accident.'
.. It is manifest, that the cause of the injury
to the plaintiff was the giving way of the earth
when the plaintiff stepped on it and the very considerable caYity underneath the surface of the
street. There is nothing in the evidence fairly to
indicate any warning to the defendant of this defective condition, or any breach of obligation on
the part of the defendant in not discovering it.
The liability of the defendant is not established.
The case is governed on this point by Taylor v.
Sterling, 250 Mass. 123, 145 N.E. 40, and the cases
there reviewed.
"There was no evidence to warrant a finding
of neglect of duty by the defendant.
"Verdict ordered to be entered for defendant
to stand."

Bello v. City of Cleveland, 106 Ohio St. 94, 138 N.E.
526. An adjoining property owner maintained a steam
pipe running under the sidewalk to the gutter. Plaintiff
stepped off the sidewalk on to the area between the property and the sidewalk. It looked natural, but when he.
stepped on it, it gave way letting him sink into boiling
water and steam. A directed verdict for the city was affirmed. The court said:
"but the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses
very clearly establishes the fact that there were no
surface indications of a nuisance at that point, and
that when plaintiff stepped off the sidewalk the
surface, which appeared to be safe and free from
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even the appearance of danger, suddenly gave
way, thereby permitting his leg to sink into the
boiling substance, and causing the iri.jury and damage. Inasmuch as there was no open defect, in the
nature of things the city's agents could not have
notice or knowledge of such non-existent situation.
"Notice, either actual or imputed, is just as
necessary to be proven as the existence of the nuisance itself. This must necessarily mean notice
or knowledge of the actual present existence of a
condition, and not notice or knowledge of some
probable or possible acts of some third person
from which it may be inferred that, if those acts
are in future committed, a nuisance may be
caused."

Smith v. Krebs, 166 Kan. 586, 203 P. 2d 215. Krebs
maintained an area way in the sidewalk covered by 2 x 2
planks resting on 2 x 4 cross pieces. When plaintiff
stepped on one of the planks it gave way letting her foot
and leg into the hole. Examination after the accident
disclosed the board was rotted on the under side, A demurrer to plaintiff's evidence was sustained. The court
says:
"The general rule is that when a street or sidewalk is once constructed so that it is reasonably
safe for use of travelers or pedestrians and later
becomes defective the city cannot be said to be
negligent so as to be liable in tort resulting from
the use of such defective street until the eitY has
knowledge or notice of such defect and has ~ reasonable opportunity to repair it.
"In this case it is conceded the <'itY did not
have knowledge of the defect, and th~rP is no
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daim that it was patent. The board plaintiff
stepped on looked as sound as any of the others.
There was nothing in the appearance of the covering over the hole in the sidewalk which would cause
anyone looking at it to think it was otherwise than
sound.
"Therefore, under the authority of the cases
above cited, it is clear that no negligence of the
city was shown."

Sherman v. City of Pittsburgh, 155 Pa. Super 560,
39 A. 2d 156. Plaintiff was injured when a portion of the
sidewalk gave way under him in front of the old post office. The court says :
"In the present case the injuries suffered by
plaintiff were the result of a defective condition
in the sidewalk, but the liability of the city arises
only if it had notice, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such condition at the place where the
accident occurred. Good et al v. Philadelphia et al,
355 Pa. 13, 16, 6 A. 2d 101. To have charged the
city with constructive notice, it must have appeared that the dangerous condition was apparent upon reasonable inspection.
"We are of the opinion that the record in this
case fails to disclose any negligence upon the part
of the city, or any notice, actual or constructive,
to the city of any danger in the condition of the
sidewalk at the place where plaintiff sustained his
accident.
"The defect in the sidewalk was latent and not
observable. Neither the plaintiff nor his witnesses
testified that there was anything about the sidewalk to indicate that it was in a dangerous condition. Plaintiff testified that he used the sidewalk
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where the accident happened, almost every day.
It appears, as told by himself, that, at the time, 'I
was looking where I was walking.' He said there
was 'nothing unusual with the sidewalk. "\Yell,
I would say there was a few cracks in the sidewalk; that is about all.'"
Dow v. Town of D'Lo, 152 So. 475 Miss.
"The fact that mere passers-by did not observe or discover a dangerous defect is not sufficient to relieve a municipality of constructive
notice ; but if the defect or danger be such as not
to be observable by those who constantly pass day
by day or who for years have lived and labored at
the location in question, constructive notice cannot
be charged upon the municipality unless the danger was the result of faulty work by the municipality itself. As to danger of this nature, the·
town cannot be charged with the neglect of ordinary care to discover what other persons constantly thereabout, including the nearest neighbors, had not discovered in all these years."
POINT NO. IV. THE VERDICT, THOUGH AWARDING
I)AMAGES AS SPECIAL DAMAGES, SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A GENERAL VERDICT IN THE SUM OF $1000
AND IS NO GROUNDS FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The form of verdict submitted to the jury, in the
event they found for the plaintiff was in form calling for
stating separately the amount of general damage and
the amount of special damage. Opposite the words "general damage$--------", the jury wrote the words "no." After
the words "special damages" they placed the figure $1000
after the dollar sign.
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Having granted defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict the trial court's overruling
the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict
was improperly rendered would follow as a matter of
course. 'ye have been unable to find any authority directly in point. However, Oregon and Minnesota courts
have passed on the validity of a verdict reading as follows:
"We find for plaintiff and assess damage in
the sum of $--------, no damage,"
and came to opposite conclusions.
In Royal Indemnity Co. v. Island Lake Township, 177
Minn. 408, 225 N.W. 291, the court held that such averdict was valid and was in reality a verdict for defendant.
In Kline v. Miller, ______ Or.------, 77 P. 2d 1103, 116 A.L.R.
820, the Oregon Court held the verdict not sufficient to
support a judgment for defendant and sustained an order
for a new triaL A strong dissenting opinion follows the
Minnesota ruling and relied upon the following statement
from Lew v. Lucas, 37 Or. 208,61 P. 344:
"A verdict should be construed liberally ...
If the meaning of the jury can be ascertained and
the point in issue can be concluded from its verdict, the court will, however informally it may be
expressed, mold it into form, and make it serve·."
In Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P. 2d 505, 81
A.L.R. 908, the plaintiff sue.d for actual and punitive damages in an action for libel and slander. The words charged
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were actionable per se. The jury found for plaintiff and
assessed no amount for actual damages and $5,000 as
punitive damages. The court held the verdict valid saying:
"The fact that the jury inadvertently or by
some mischance assessed the entire damages as
exemplary instead of segregating them constitutes an error of form rather than of sustenance."
While on the surface there appears to be an inconsistency in the jury's verdict, we think the intention appears to find generally for the plaintiff in a total sum of
$1,000. The jury, apparently, decided plaintiff was entitled to recover and instead of trying to make a separate
finding of general and special damages they simply
awarded the sum of $1,000 as being the total amount to
which plaintiff was entitled. We submit, therefore, that
there was no error in overruling plaintiff's motion for a
new trial
CONCLUSION

The order granting defendant's motion to dismiss
should be sustained. First, there was no proof of negligence on the part of defendant. There was absolutely
no proof whatever that at the time the areidrnt happened, there was any actionable defect in the sidewalk
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at the place of the accident of which the city would have,
or could have had, notice. That the city is not liable for
a latent defect is conceded by plaintiff. The evidence
offered by plaintiff of the condition of the sidewalk after
the accident wholly failed to establish the existence of an
actionable defect at the time of the accident. Furthermore, it \vas incompetent, as no proper foundation had
been laid.
Second, whatever unevenness existed between the
city sidewalk and the entrance walk into the apartment
building, assuming some unevenness existed at the time
of the accident (as to which, however, we assert there is
no proof) there is no proof whatever that such unevenness was the proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff
did not stumble, slip, turn his ankle, or in any wise encounter such difference in elevation.
Third. The failure to eliminate the separation of
the city walk from the adjoining walk, called a crack by
plaintiff, and the other cracks did not in any wise contribute as a proximate cause of the accident. Furthermore, the existence of such cracks by themselves did not
constitute any actionable defect in the sidewalk. There
is no evidence, or even any assertion by plaintiff, that
these cracks gave any notice of existence of the cavity.
The simple fact is that in some unexplained manner,
without any notice whatever to the city, the supporting
earth had been removed under the sidewalk and the
concrete gave way under plaintiff's weight. The defect
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thus existing was latent, not discoverable upon reasonable inspection. Therefore, the city is not liable for the
unfortunate accident, and dismissal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOLM:GREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Assistant City Attorneys
Attorneys for Respondent
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